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A web application utilizes Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) to surf client requests. This protocol is used widely, 
especially in business areas such as in online transactions and 
websites, including in government websites. A client delivers 
information to a server carried by a client web browser. An 
HTTP distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack occurs 
when the attacker is able to mimic client information, which 
makes a DDoS attack at the application layer difficult to 
distinguish as the traffic pattern is similar to a genuine 
request. Furthermore, it is not compulsory for the client to 
present the GET headers component to a web server during 
the GET request transaction. Existing detection of HTTP 
DDoS attacks still faces challenges in differentiating between 
authentic and bogus GET requests in real time. In this paper, a 
fast algorithm (FARGO) method to detect HTTP DDoS 
attacks is introduced. FARGO consists of three detection 
algorithms to recognize HTTP DDoS categories as request 
flooding attacks. The assessment of the proposed detection 
system was conducted in real experimental conditions with 
real attack scripts. The proposed detection method provided 
expected outcomes with improvements of 11.30% for true 
positive rates and 8.9% for false-positive rates. 
 





A web server utilizes HTTP and HTTPS protocols to surf 
client requests through a network. These protocols are widely 
used in many business areas such as in payment gateways, 
online purchasing, banking, credit card transactions, etc. 
Attackers target these services by causing a web server to 
become unavailable through launching attacks known as 
HTTP DDoS attacks. Most DDoS attacks executed at the 
application layer nowadays target the HTTP port [1]. DDoS 
attacks lead to loss of trust and revenue [2]. Past studies [2-4] 
have found DDoS attack patterns at the application layer as 
being similar to genuine request packets. Singh, Singh [5] 
attributed the existence of DDoS attacks to application 
 
 
settings and functions that cause the attack to target web 
server resources such as the CPU, network and memory [6].  
 
DDoS attacks execute at layer seven requires establishing 
TCP connection to a web server before can perform a 
transaction at the application layer. Single TCP connection 
can contain multiple GET request [7] due to this circumstance 
attacker sent the GET request continuously. To generate 
massive traffic, the attacker utilizes botnets to deliver a high 
number of requests from a web server. The location of botnets 
is also distributed, which makes the generation of enormous 
amounts of traffic easy and fast. Aamir and Zaidi [8] 
explained that due to botnet architecture being scattered and 
comprised of a number of compromised machines, a DoS 
attack can easily turn into a DDoS attack.  
 
Nowadays, modern devices adopt the Internet of Things 
technology, which refers to everything that can access the 
Internet, such as a television set. The Internet of Things (IoT) 
opens up a new avenue for an attacker to launch DDoS 
attacks, which will contribute to more cyber-attacks. Devices 
with IoT technology can become easily accessible tools in a 
cyber army’s plan to launch attacks as they are always 
connected to the Internet with a naive security update and 
patch [9]. The emerging of generation five networks (5G) 
deliver a significant impact to formation of HTTP DDoS 
attack. The 5G network provides faster speed and more 
reliable connection for other equipment’s and smart 
phone[10]. HTTP DDoS can be launched in many platforms 
such as IOT devices, which comprise of smart phone and 
cameras, which can utilize 5G network. These types of 
devices are vulnerable to be affected due to week security 
patch. Launch HTTP DDoS by adopted 5G network lead to 
faster flooding of the web server due to higher speed of the 
Internet provided by the network. 
 
Aside from that, the existence of online services, such as 
boosters or stressers, to easily facilitate such attacks 
contributes to the increase in such attacks [11]. A DDoS 
attack is easier to implement than other network attacks as it 
only requires a large number of zombie machines and 
minimal knowledge of security to execute the attack [12]. By 
using an efficient attack script, the attacker requires fewer 
resources to generate huge amounts of traffic [13, 14]. 
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Several detection methods have been introduced to recognize 
such attacks. Nevertheless, due to their ability to mimic 
normal client behavior, and the different strategies devised to 
launch attacks, these attacks are difficult to recognize. In this 
paper, a method of detecting HTTP DDoS attacks, focusing 
on flooding attacks, is presented. The proposed detection 
method is called FARGO and consists of three detection 
algorithms segregated into regular inspection, medium 
inspection and deep inspection. Each algorithm consists of 
GET header components that have been used by authentic 
clients to browse the content of a web server.  
 
The proposed detection technique allowed an administrator to 
select which inspection they wanted in order to recognize the 
attack. Regular inspection determines whether the source of 
the GET request was initiated from a web browser or via 
automated tools by accessing browser width and height. 
Medium inspection combines regular inspection with 
checking the existence of GET headers such as user-agent, 
accept-language, connection and accept-encoding. Deep 
inspection combines regular, medium and query inspection 
received in GET requests. The selection of GET components 
was based on traffic analysis of components that were 
commonly employed by attackers to make the traffic appear 
genuine. Results obtained from the experiments (Section 7) 
indicated that the detection method worked as expected where 
malicious GET requests instituted by HTTP DDoS attacks 
were detected successfully. The main contributions of this 
paper can be summarized as follows: 
 
i)    Introduction of three detection algorithms to detect 
HTTP DDoS attacks. 
ii)    Increasing true positive rates and reducing false 
positive rates. 
iii) The proposed detection method can be implemented in 
production network environments.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
explains DDoS attack categories at the application layer. 
Section 3 provides an overview of detection systems proposed 
by prior studies. Section 4 explains the experiment 
architecture and datasets. Section 5 describes about traffic 
analysis and feature extraction. Section 6 elaborates about the 
analysis command. Dataset analysis conducted in Section 7, 
while Section 8 explained about the proposed detection 
algorithms while section 9 provides details about evaluation 
architecture. Result and discussion in section 10 and continue 
with section 11 comparison with other studies. A summary 
and future works are described in Section 12. 
 
2. HTTP DDOS ATTACK CATEGORIES 
 
DDoS attacks at the application layer are divided into several 
categories, as explained by previous researchers [15-20]. 
Detailed explanations pertaining to the categories are as 
follows:  
 
2.1 Session Flooding Attack: Server resources become 
overloaded due to enormous session request rates. This type 
of attack is known as DDoS flooding and the attacker requires 
a large number of genuine HTTP requests. The attacker 
usually utilizes a botnet because it has the ability to launch a 
valid request. Commonly, GET requests initiated by a botnet 
exceed 10 requests per second. 
 
2.2 Request Flooding Attack: This attack category takes 
advantage of HTTP 1.1 structure, which allows multiple 
requests in one session. Due to this vulnerability, attackers 
generate vast numbers of requests in one session, which are 
larger than genuine users’ requests. Rai and Challa [21] stated 
that the attacks utilized botnets to launch the attack. This type 
of attack is able to cause a server to become unresponsive 
when it receives the huge number of HTTP GET requests 
generated by a botnet. 
 
2.3 Asymmetric Attack: A server experiences a high 
workload when an attacker employs an HTTP session to send 
a high number of requests to download files from a database 
server, or excessive requests to execute queries from the 
server. 
 
2.4 Slow Request/Response Attack: Partial HTTP requests 
are sent, which grow quickly, slowly update and never close 
the connection, which makes the server socket unavailable. 
The attack operates under the threshold limit and with traffic 
patterns similar to authentic patterns, which make it difficult 
to detect [21]. A server will continuously remind clients to 
open its connections as each GET request received fails to 
complete the transaction, which will result in clients being 
unable to gain access to a server due to full concurrent 
connections. 
 
3. RELATED WORKS 
 
In this paper, HTTP GET header components are utilized as a 
form of detection to recognize DDoS attacks executed at the 
application layer, in order to improve true positive rates and 
false positive rates. Many prior studies have introduced 
solutions pertaining to such attacks. This section summarizes 
the current research work on detecting HTTP DDoS attacks. 
 
Hameed and Ali [11] introduced a DDoS detection method 
that executes at the network and application layers. The 
detection method consists of two components called the 
capture server and detection server. The detection server will 
receive live network traffic from a capture server for 
processing. The detection method counts incoming packets 
and will detect them as attacks when the source connection 
exceeds a pre-defined threshold responsible for capturing live 
traffic. The authors used timestamps, source IPs, destination 








Idhammad, Afdel [22] proposed information theoretic entropy 
and machine learning to detect HTTP DDoS attacks in cloud 
services. The detection technique proposed by the authors 
consists of three steps: entropy estimation, pre-processing and 
classification. Features of the network headers for inbound 
network traffic are used to estimate entropy, which is 
performed by an algorithm called the time-based sliding 
window. A pre-processing algorithm will execute when the 
entropy exceeds normal range. Clarification of HTTP DDoS 
attacks will occur at this stage, and network traffic will be 
cleaned and normalized to recent time windows. 
 
Behal, Kumar [23] introduced a flexible, automated and 
collaborative defense system called D-FACE to detect and 
mitigate impacts of DDoS attacks. The idea behind this 
defense strategy is to compute the information of the distance 
between authentic and network traffic anomalies by 
employing information theory-based divergence metrics, to 
recognize types of DDoS attacks. The proposed detection 
technique has a minimal overhead for computational speed 
and memory compared with other types of deployment such 
as a victim-end defense. 
 
Singh, Singh [24] employed a machine learning method to 
recognize HTTP DDoS attacks. The proposed detection 
method is able to differentiate botnets from authentic users in 
malicious traffic, legitimate user traffic and flash crowd 
traffic. The detection method is also able to identify botnet 
locations and assess client attitudes to detect attack traffic 
towards a web server. The detection technique employs 
request index, response index, popularity index, repetition 
index and classifier algorithms in order to examine user 
behavior and is deployed as a proxy. Meanwhile, Zhao, Zhang 
[25] introduced a detection method based on user access 
behavior characteristics. URL access pattern is used to detect 
DDoS attack at application layer. 
 
Sreeram and Vuppala [26] recommended fast and early 
detection to recognize HTTP DDoS attacks by using a 
machine-learning matrix. Instead of sessions from users and 
packet patterns, the authors utilized time intervals to 
constitute a detection algorithm. Maximum sessions for 
one-time intervals are processed by the machine-learning 
matrix to detect DDoS attacks at the application layer. The 
authors also counted the frequency of web pages being 
browsed and the time gaps between first-page access and 
second-page access by the user to evaluate client access 
patterns. 
 
Aborujilah and Musa [27] introduced a detection technique 
based on behavior and proposed two training and testing 
algorithms to identify different categories of HTTP flooding 
attacks. The authors utilized TCP packet headers and 
statistical approaches with a covariance matrix to detect 
HTTP DDoS attacks in the cloud environment. Normal access 
patterns are constructed by the training algorithm while types 
of traffic received are identified by the testing algorithm.  
 
Singh and De [28] employed multilayer perceptron with a 
genetic algorithm (MLP-GA) to detect HTTP DDoS attacks.  
The detection system utilizes the number of HTTP counts, the 
number of IP addresses, the constant mapping function and 
fixed frame lengths. A GET request received by a web server 
will be counted and any IP address accessing a web server for 
more than 20 seconds will be evaluated. According to the 
authors, attackers utilize static protocol lengths, hence fixed 
frame lengths were used to conduct detection. The authors 
used three datasets: EPA-HTTP, CAIDA 2007 and 
Experiment Dataset. 
 
Hoque, Kashyap [29] utilized correlation measures to detect 
real-time DDoS attacks at the victim-end. The detection 
approach extracts three features during pre-processing of 
network traffic, i.e., entropy of source IPs, variation index of 
source IPs and packet rate, to create a normal profile. The 
authors explained that the proposed system would detect 
attacks when the distance between normal and live traffic was 
more than the threshold value. The study used three datasets: 
CAIDA, TUIDS and DARPA. 
 
Liao, Li [30] utilized request interval sequences and request 
frequency sequences to develop a detection method based on 
user access frequencies. According to the authors, time 
interval for authentic user will be longer when visiting 
interesting pages. However, time interval for DDoS is much 
shorter. The studies utilized ClarkNet HTTP and Experiment 
Dataset. 
 
A client will deliver several GET header requests to a web 
server during the transaction of an HTTP GET request. The 
GET headers contain several components such as user-agent, 
accept-language, connection status, query, accept charset and 
any related header available from the client. Most of the 
HTTP DDoS attack detection approaches proposed in the 
literature exhibited minimal inspection of these components 
during the operation of GET requests. DDoS attacks at the 
application layer deliver incorrect GET headers and provide 
false GET header values to mimic authentic requests, in order 
to conceal their activity. Additionally, the use of automated 
tools to generate a large amount of requests is one of the 
minimal approaches to detection in prior studies. It is 
proposed here that inspection of GET header components and 
browser features will provide fast detection, i.e., before the 
attack causes a web server to become unresponsive due to 
enormous amounts of GET requests. 
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT FOR DATASET 
PREPARATION 
 
This section explains the experimental equipment used to 
evaluate the proposed detection method and the self-generated 
datasets for the purpose of analysis of HTTP DDoS traffic. 
Due to the unavailability of datasets for HTTP DDoS attacks, 
this research executed real experiments to self-generate HTTP 
DDoS attack datasets to analyze the attack patterns. The 
existence of datasets for HTTP DDoS attacks has been 




mentioned in several past studies. The Jazi, Gonzalez [31] 
limitation to gain datasets led to all prior studies utilizing 
simulation software like NS2 and MATLAB. Existing 
datasets for DDoS attacks only capture network layer 
information while concealing application layer information 
[32]. Jaafar, Abdullah [33] used real HTTP DDoS tools to 
predict future HTTP DDoS attack strategy and for input on 
recent attack patterns. Past studies adopt obsolete dataset for 
validation hence generate the dataset close to actual network 
topologies is necessary [34]. 
 
The experimental architecture consisted of a web server 
running on Windows 2012 R2 while the client and attacker 
machines were run as virtual machines. The attacker’s 
operating system was Ubuntu while the authentic client used 
Windows 8. A simple HTML page was designed and run as 
HTTP protocol for the genuine client to access and for the 
attacker to launch the attack against. Four attack scripts were 
then selected to launch attacks against the web server. The 
tools used to launch the HTTP DDoS attacks were publicly 
available. Table 1 provides a summary. 
 














































5. TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND FEATURE 
EXTRACTION 
 
An analysis of HTTP DDoS attack traffic was conducted 
utilizing four real DDoS tools executed at the application 
layer. This analysis mainly focused on GET header 
components, with each tool being launched separately to 
acquire traffic patterns. DDoS attacks launched at the 
application layer are able to create a large number of GET 
requests with the help of efficient attack scripts and a minimal 
number of resources [13, 14]. The attack duration was 
specified as five minutes. Figure 1 provides a graphical view 

























Figure 1: Analysis Environment 
 
An HTTP DDoS attack has the ability to mimic human 
requests. Due to this characteristic, a number of attack 
strategies were utilized to mimic user access patterns. 
Nonetheless, for DDoS flooding attacks at the application 
layer, the high-frequency access pattern was equal for all 
attack scripts. To overwhelm web server resources 
immediately, the attack must be sent in high frequency. 
Although attacks of 5-minute duration were launched against 
the web server, the attack script had the capability to send 
large amounts of traffic against the web server. All attack 
scripts utilized in this paper generated thousands of requests 
for GET requests. A summary of generated GET requests is 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Total Traffic Generated by HTTP DDoS Attacks 
No. Attack script Number of GET 
Requests 
1. ChiHulk.py  88,769 
2. Golden Eye.py 21,257 
3. Blackhorizon.py 23,974 
4. HOIC.exe 97,332 
 
6. HTTP COMMANDS ANALYSIS 
 
Traffic analysis of web applications requires several 
commands to observe communications between the client and 
the web server. A type of software known as Wireshark 
provides many commands to analyze HTTP GET headers. To 
facilitate the analysis process, this research outlined several 
commands required to execute to examine DDoS traffic 












Table 3: Analysis Commands 
No Command Details 
1. http Shows protocol HTTP only 
2. http.request Displays HTTP GET 
request 
3. http.user_agent Displays user agent in GET 
request 
4. http.referrer Displays HTTP referrer in 
GET request 
5. http.request.uri.query Displays HTTP query in 
GET request 
9. http.connection Shows HTTP Status in GET 
request 
 
7. DATASET ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
The analysis conducted on all attack scripts found that a 
variety of user-agents were employed, which showed that a 
web server was accessible from a different machine without it 
observing the source IP address of the GET request. The 
attack traffic also generated query strings that could not be 
understood by humans, with a combination of upper-case 
letters, lower case letters and special characters. In addition, 
the source of the HTTP referral came from a valid resource 
with a combination of queries that consisted of numbers and 
characters. Table 4 presents the attack logs from the HTTP 
GET requests. 
 
Table 4: Attack Logs 
User Agent 
String 















































































































Detailed analysis found that the DDoS attacks launched at the 
application layer presented inconsistent GET headers, where 
some of the GET headers were missing during the transaction 
of the GET requests. According to [35], common GET 
headers utilized are Host, Connection, Accept-Encoding, 
User-Agent, Accept-Language, Accept and Content-Type. 
Besides these common headers, GET headers also contain a 
Keep-Alive header. Keep-Alive is a component for HTTP 
response that indicates attackers accidentally assigning that 
header to GET requests, which shows evidence that the HTTP 
GET request is malicious. Figure X presents the HTTP logs. 

















Based on the analysis of this research, six components of GET 
headers had the potential to be utilized to detect HTTP 
flooding attacks occurring at the application layer. Table 5 
presents the GET header components and the proposed 
detection. 
 





1. Detects existence 
of GET headers 
for each request 
received. 






2. Detects false and 
irrelevant query in 
GET request. 
 
HTTP request query 
 





8. PROPOSED DETECTION ALGORITHMS 
 
In this section, the process flows to detect HTTP DDoS 
attacks, as well as the components of the proposed detection 
system, are given. The detection component comprises of 
GET header components, which inspired by past studies [36, 
37]. The proposed detection method, called FARGO fast 
algorithm to recognize HTTP DDoS attacks, consists of three 
detection algorithms and was designed in pairings where an 
administrator can choose to utilize GET header inspection, 
query inspection or HTTP referrer inspection. FARGO was 
designed to be located at the front-end of the web server and 
behind a firewall. This design is also known as a victim-end 
defense. [15] explained a victim-end defense as detection 
placed within a victim border at the front-end of a web server. 
Figure 9.1 presents the logical architecture for this detection 
strategy. A detailed explanation of the detection process for 
each detection algorithm is set out in Sections 8.2 to 8.3. 
FARGO was developed using VB.Net programming language 
by adapting GET header components. Figure 3 illustrated the 











Figure 3:  Logical Architecture of Proposed 
 Detection Method 
 
8.1 GET HEADER INSPECTION ALGORITHM 
 
Each request received required adherence to GET header 
rules. This inspection was performed by the GET header 
inspection algorithm. The GET request connection had to 
present common GET headers with the same genuine request. 
A GET request that successfully passed this inspection was 
also required to pass a sub-inspection. The sub-inspection 
examined the connection status of either “Keep-Alive”, 
“keep-alive” or “close”. If the received GET header had a 
status of “close”, the connection was detected as an HTTP 
DDoS attack. The use of upper case or lower-case letters for 
“Keep-Alive” depends on the web browser. Internet Explorer 
and Google Chrome use “Keep-Alive”, while Mozilla Firefox 
uses “keep-alive”. All the components inspected by this 
algorithm had been tested as components used by authentic 




























Figure 4: GET Header Inspection Algorithm 
 
8.2 HTTP REQUEST QUERY INSPECTION 
ALGORITHM  
 
The use of a query in HTTP GET requests makes a request 
much closer to a human request. Furthermore, with the help of 
automated tools, the query can be simply generated. Hence, a 
query inspection algorithm was introduced to recognize bogus 
queries generated by HTTP DDoS attacks. A received GET 
request was inspected to assess whether it contained a request 
query or not. A GET request had to contain a query with an 
upper-case letter, and special characters were rejected. This 
strategy was based on user’s behavior when querying 




information on a web server where it was noted that users 
seldom included upper case letters or other characters. They 
used lower case letters such as “a”, “b”, or “c” to “z”. The 
query also had to be short and not longer than four letters. 
DDoS attacks try to mimic human language and generate 
words that can be understood by humans, but that situation 
was not relevant here as the algorithm used compared the 
query received with a string database. The string database 
contained a list of keywords that related to a web server. A 
GET request was marked as genuine by this algorithm if it 
passed all inspections or did not contain a query in the GET 

























Figure 5:  Request Query Inspection Algorithm 
 
8.3 HTTP REFERRER INSPECTION ALGORITHM 
 
HTTP DDoS attacks have the ability to mimic human access. 
Hence, an attacker makes use of HTTP referrals to make a 
GET request more genuine and appear to come from a human 
access pattern. The HTTP referrer inspection algorithm 
scrutinized HTTP referrals in each GET header to inspect 
their relevancy. For example, a university website should 
have links related to the website such as from search engines 
like Google or any related education site. If the referral 
contains a link from an online shopping website, the 
connection is suspicious. When a value of HTTP referral is 
referred to the URL, it shows the previous website address of 

































Figure 6: HTTP Referrer Inspection Algorithm 
 
9. EVALUATION ARCHITECTURE 
 
This section describes the experiments conducted and the 
performance metrics used to evaluate the proposed approach. 
All proposed algorithms were tested before being compared. 
Test results showed that DDoS attacks could be fully detected 
by using the proposed algorithms. They also showed that 
utilizing GET header components and strategies to recognize 
the attacks worked as expected. However, a comparison with 
past studies showed a detection performance drop. The 
researchers believe that the performance drop was due to the 
huge number of requests generated by the DDoS attacks, 
which made the detection device unable to handle such 
requests. The comparison utilized real HTTP DDoS tools 
such as HULK, GoldenEye and HOIC, which were also used 
by prior studies to evaluate their proposed detection methods. 
Genuine HTTP GET requests and HTTP DDoS attacks were 
executed simultaneously. The measurement unit to evaluate 
detection performance utilized a confusion matrix to observe 
true positives and false positives. Figure 7 shows the physical 
detection architecture for evaluation, while Table 6 presents 







Figure 7: Experiment Architecture 
                 



















10. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The detection performance shown by the FARGO fast 
algorithm method displayed expected performance where all 
detection matrices provided 100% detection for true positive, 
true negative, precision, false positive, false negative and 
accuracy. The results showed that inspection of GET headers 
to recognize HTTP DDoS attacks in real time was 
successfully achieved. The GET header inspection algorithm 
ensured that genuine components must appear during HTTP 
transactions and failure to present the components would 
result in detection of an HTTP DDoS attack. The results also 
showed that the first algorithm had the capability to 
differentiate between complete and incomplete GET header 
requests performed either by an attacker or an authentic user. 


















Figure 8: Detection Performance of GET Header Inspection 
 
During HTTP GET request transaction a web server will be 
received GET header from client to inform the identity of the 
source request. However, during the occurrence of HTTP 
DDoS, the pattern is absolutely differed, which make FARGO 
reach 100% detection for matrix measured. Although HTTP 
DDoS had an ability to manipulate GET header components 
to look genuine, part of the components not able to be 
manipulated by the attacker such as Accept-Language. Gou, 
Bai [35] explained an authentic GET request deliver complete 














Figure 9: Genuine GET Header Component 
 
The outcomes from the request query inspection algorithm, 
when checking against GET header requests, either contained 
a request query or were empty. The outputs from this 
algorithm signified that false GET header requests were able 
to be distinguished satisfactorily. The outputs also provided 
clear indicators to recognize bogus queries sent by HTTP 
DDoS attacks to mimic human requests. The achievement of 
these results also showed that extraction of request queries 
from received GET headers worked smoothly in real time. 



















Figure 10: Detection Performance - Query Inspection 
 
Results at section 7.0 indicate HTTP DDoS delivery 
unreadable format for request query in HTTP GET request. 
Human query is readable, which contradict with the query 
patterns deliver by HTTP DDoS. HTTP DDoS generate false 
query to emulate authentic request to conceal their activity to 
make a web server overwhelmed with plenty of requests. 
Furthermore, there is no mechanism to detect HTTP DDoS 
through request query. FARGO performs inspection against 
the request query to determine the relevancy of query in GET 
request, which makes the detection matrix reach 100% 
detection. A web server adopts in this research hosted a web 
Detection Matrix Description 
True Positive (TP) Number of attacks 
correctly classified 
as attacks 




Confusion Matrix Calculation Formula 
True Positive Rate TP / (TP + FN) 
False Positive Rate FP / (FP + TN) 




page that has been design not to accept query. However, 
results received at section 8.0 indicate false query received by 
a web server which a sign of HTTP DDoS has been occurred. 
The performance of the HTTP referrer detection algorithm 
also indicated a positive output. Results gained from this 
algorithm showed that irrelevant HTTP referrers were able to 
be recognized as expected. Figure 11 shows the performance 


















Figure 11: Detection Performance - HTTP Referrer 
Inspection 
 
HTTP referrer refer to past web site address accessible by 
users to browse the current web page. Occurrence of HTTP 
DDoS attack shows at section 8.0 the attack capable to mimic 
valid URL of past web page. This indicates detection of HTTP  
DDoS become difficult due to its ability to mimic authentic 
GET request as the GET header component is appeared with 
correct value assign to GET header components. 100% 
detection gained by FARGO due to inspection against HTTP 
referral value to check either the value of HTTP referrer is 
relevant to be referral of the current page accessed. Real 
attack was launched against test web site as explained at 
section 4.0 and existence of not related URL as referrer proof 
that HTTP DDoS utilize HTTP referrer in HTTP GET request 
to make a request look genuine. Examine the existence of the 
component will not work as the component is not consistently 
presented during GET request. The header is not presented 
when refer to local request [39]. 
 
11. COMPARISON WITH PAST STUDIES 
 
Comparison with past studies to indicate an improvement 
makes by proposed detection named as FARGO to detect 
HTTP DDoS. Comparison was done by using actual HTTP 





11.1 COMPARISON WITH TIMES SERIES 
PREDICTION MODEL 
 
Comparison with past studies disclosed that the proposed 
detection method was still able to maintain its performance 
under certain specified circumstances. A comparison was 
carried out against the Times Series Prediction Model of [40], 
utilizing the HOIC DDoS attack tool (which was also used by 
that study) to evaluate their proposed detection method. The 
FARGO detection algorithms showed an improved result of 
11.30% for the true positive rate and an 8.90% enhancement 
for the false positive rate. The HOIC is a real HTTP DDoS 
attack tool and delivers a minimum number of GET requests. 
Due to this type of delivery, the proposed algorithm was able 
to distinguish whether the requests came from a DDoS attack 
or from authentic traffic.  
 
The FARGO detection algorithms also performed inspections 
of common GET headers delivered by a requestor to a web 
server. Incomplete information during a transaction of a GET 
request resulted in detection of an HTTP DDoS attack, which 
meant that the FARGO detection algorithms could fully 
recognize the attack. The achievement of this result showed 
that DDoS attacks at the application layer could be detected 
with high true positives if the attack provides minimal 
information in the GET request, as genuine traffic will 
provide more information during the transaction between 



















Figure 12: Comparison with the Time  
Series Prediction Model 
 
11.2 COMPARISON WITH LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION ENTROPY 
 
A final comparison using logistic regression analysis of 
information entropy produced expected results with 
improvements of 1.16% for true positive rates and 1.70% for 
false positive rates. The true positive rate showed that the 
proposed detection method correctly recognized bogus traffic, 




which caused the proposed detection method to acquire 
99.95%. The false positive rate indicated no missed 
classifications for authentic traffic detected as false traffic, 
which led to a result of 0.00% for the false positive rate.  
 
Nevertheless, there were instances of attack traffic being 
recognized as genuine, which caused the detection rate for 
true positives to drop. The performance drop was due to 
several possible reasons, such as missed detection due to the 
high amount of GET requests generated by the attack and 
traffic pattern similarities with genuine requests, which made 
the proposed detection method unable to differentiate between 
authentic and forged requests. Table 7 presents the 
comparison results while Figure 13 provide graphical views 
of the detection performance. 
 














































A result at section 11.1 and comparison with Times Series 
Prediction Model shows the proposed detection able to 
maintain it performance. However, comparison with Logistic 
Regression detection technique indicates a performance drop 
due to several reasons such as: This research adopts real 
hardware with actual attack scripts to perform experiment and 
dealing with real atmosphere of HTTP DDoS. Hence 
limitation against devices is one of the main factors the 
performance was dropped. Each device had a specific 
workload can handle. Furthermore, there are no such devices 
can handle the infinity workload. Higher speed GET request 
generate by HTTP DDoS is the second reason why the 
detection performance drop. Besides that, the higher speed is 
continuously generating which make the workload of the 
detection device gradually increase until overwhelmed by 
massive GET request.  Apart from that the proposed detection 
requires time to scrutinize each received GET request to 
determine the source request is authentic of comes from 
malicious.  
 
Appearance of HTTP version 2 to provide enhancement 
against HTTP version 1.1. However, HTTP 2 still utilize the 
same GET header components utilize by HTTP 1.1. Header 
compression introduce by HTTP 2 reduce number of bytes 
sending by each request. Ludin and Garza [41] explained only 
unique byte are sending to a web server unlike HTTP 1.1 the 
entire bytes will be resent. Table 8 illustrate the explanation 
where second request only sent the unique byte, in this case 
the unique byte is only 10 bytes.  
 
Table 8: HTTP 2 GET headers 
Request 1 # Total 
Bytes 220 




: Method: GET 
: Path:/ 














: Method: GET 
: Path:/style.css 


























All proposed algorithms showed their ability to detect false 
GET requests instituted by HTTP DDoS attacks and the 
achievement of this target illustrated that the detection 
strategy of utilizing GET header components to perform 
HTTP DDoS attack detection worked as expected. Real 
experiments were conducted to indicate that the proposed 
detection method had the potential to be used in production 
network environments and revealed that the proposed method 
worked not only to reach academic targets but also to provide 
supplementary information in the detection of such attacks.  
 
To ensure that the proposed detection method has the ability 
to work in a production network environment, a variety of 
DDoS attack strategies should be further tested. Detection 
times and the workloads that can be supported by the 
proposed detection method are components that need to be 
tested in the future. HTTP DDoS attacks launched through a 
proxy and behind NAT should be another research area. In 
addition, the use of other platforms to execute HTTP DDoS 
attacks, such as IoT devices, should be examined. Further, the 
proposed method could have the potential to detect DDoS 
attacks classified as low rate and flash crowd with 
enhancements of several sections in the proposed detection 
algorithms. The proposed detection is possible to work with 
HTTP 2 as GET the header components to form detection in 
this research is still utilized by HTTP 2. However, DDoS 
attack occurs at the application layer employ HTTP 2 are still 
uncertain. Moreover, HTTP 1.1 is still widely used, and 
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